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Abstract
Contrary to Bourdieu's thesis, it is not only when a subject's habitus does not ﬁt a ﬁeld's positions that s/he
becomes more reﬂexive. Reﬂexivity is also enhanced by intra-habitus tensions, by more general
incongruences between dispositions, positions, and interactive/ﬁgurational structures, as well as by
situations unrelated to them. Because of his ambitious but unsuccessful attempt to transcend the
objectivist-subjectivist divide in the social sciences, Bourdieu underemphasizes the interactive dimension
of social games, and this creates serious problems for his conceptualization of the linkages between
habitus, reﬂexivity, and practices. The way to make Bourdieu's theory of practice less functionalist and/or
deterministic is to restructure it so that it seriously takes into account not only the dispositional and
positional but also the interactive dimension of social games. It then becomes obvious that reﬂexive
accounting, conscious strategizing, and rational calculation are not exceptional but routine, constitutive
elements of human action.
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Introduction
1.1 A critical assessment of the relationship between the notions of habitus and of reﬂexivity must start
with the habitus–reﬂexivity connection being placed within Bourdieu's overall "theory–of–practice" scheme.
For the French sociologist the habitus, as a set of dispositions (i.e. of generative schemata of cognition,
perception, evaluation etc.), is the major link between social structures on the one hand and practices on
the other. Social structures, via various socialization processes, are internalized and become dispositions,
and dispositions lead to practices which, in turn, reproduce social structures. It is in this way, according to
Bourdieu, that the habitus transcends the objectivist-subjectivist divide in the social sciences: it is both
structured and structuring, an objective product of social structures as well as the producer of practices
reproducing social structures (Bourdieu 1977, 1990). To put it schematically, we have:
Social Structures (S) → Dispositions (D) → Practices (P).[1]
1.2 The SDP scheme has often been criticized as being mechanistic and deterministic or as differing very
little from Parsons' oversystemic, functionalist analysis of social action (Jenkins 1991, Mouzelis 1995:
100-26). Bourdieu has defended his scheme by arguing that the habitus does not automatically lead to
practices and that on the contrary, it is ﬂexible, "polysemic and polythetic". Rather than strictly determining
practices, it operates as a limiting framework within which a great number of practices can be produced.
"The habitus, like every 'art of inventing' is what makes it possible to produce an inﬁnite
number of practices that are relatively unpredictable, even if they are limited in their
diversity" (Bourdieu 1990: 63).
It is precisely this inventive ﬂexibility that allows the habitus carrier, when s/he enters a speciﬁc ﬁeld, to
cope with the varied requirements that "positions" entail.
1.3According to Bourdieu, this type of polythetic adaptability operates in a taken-for-granted, non-reﬂexive
manner, however. In normal circumstances the habitus functions in a way that entails neither introspection
nor calculation; in normal circumstances an actor's dispositions and the ﬁeld's positions lead to practices
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of ﬁt between dispositions and positions, that reﬂexivity and rational strategizing enter the scene. When
positions change and strategies lag behind, the "Don Quixote effect" occurs. This obliges the habitus
carrier to abandon her/his taken-for-granted orientations and to adopt more reﬂexive, calculating modes of
operation (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 131).
1. Dispositions, Positions, Interactions
2.1 The ﬁrst objection to Bourdieu's thesis about the habitus-reﬂexivity relationship is that, in order to
understand what role reﬂexivity assumes in a given ﬁeld, one has to consider not only the dispositional and
positional but also the interactive dimension of the social games played within it. If a ﬁeld's game entails
the varied internalized dispositional structures of the players involved, it also entails not only relations
between positions (i.e. in conventional sociology, the role/institutional structure of the game) but also the
actual relations between actors (in Elias' terminology, ﬁgurational structures).[2]
2.2 To be more concrete, in a football game for instance each situated player, as the carrier of dispositions
(acquired via various socializations) has to pay attention not only to the game's rules that apply to her/his
position and the position of the other players, but also to the actual interactive relations between players as
these unfold syntagmatically in time and space. In other words, a speciﬁc habitus carrier has to take in
account both the game's institutional structure (i.e. the relationships between roles/positions), and
ﬁgurational structures (i.e. the relationships between actual players). Figurational structures are not
reducible to institutional structures, since there is often a discrepancy between what is demanded by a
role's normative requirements and what actually happens in the context of the game's concrete interactive
processes. Therefore, a ﬁeld and the game related to it entails three rather than two social structures: (i)
internalized dispositional structures (the habitus) based on what Bourdieu calls a practical logic, (ii)
institutional structures (the system of positions) operating on the basis of a normative logic, and (iii)
ﬁgurational structures (systems of patterned relationships between real actors) operating on the basis of an
interactive and strategizing logic.[3]
2. Reﬂexivity
2.3 If the above is accepted, rational and/or reﬂexive calculation does not appear, as Bourdieu argues, only
when there is a lack of ﬁt between dispositions and positions. It appears also
when there are incongruencies between dispositional, positional and ﬁgurational structures;
when there are intra-habitus (intra-dispositional) contradictions;
when persons are reﬂexive, irrespective of how congruent or incongruent dispositions are vis-￠-vis
positions and/or ﬁgurations.
Reﬂexivity and contradictions between dispositions, positions, ﬁgurations
2.4 Consideration of the interactive-ﬁgurational dimension of social games makes it obvious that an actor's
dispositions might be in conﬂict not only with a ﬁeld's system of positions but also with its ﬁgurational
structures, with the way in which actual players rather than positions relate to each other. Let us take as
an example M. Crozier's classical study of a formal organization where a group of actors, taking advantage
of an area of "organizational uncertainty", manage to monopolize key resources and to impose their will on
their hierarchical superiors (Crozier, 1963: 200ff). In this case we have an incongruence between a de jure
situation (constituted by the normative requirements entailed in the hierarchical system of positions) and a
de facto situation consisting of emergent relationships between actual interacting subjects struggling for
control over strategic resources. This means that there is a lack of ﬁt between institutional and ﬁgurational
structures. Although Crozier does not deal with the issue of reﬂexivity, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
the actors involved (particularly those whose hierarchically superior positions gave them rights of
command there were unable to exercise) became more aware both of the ﬁeld's institutional and
ﬁgurational structures, as well as of the lack of ﬁt between dispositions, positions, and ﬁgurations.
Reﬂexivity and intra-habitus contradictions
2.5 Reﬂexivity may focus less on interactive and more on intra-active processes. In other words, reﬂexivity
may be enhanced not only when there are contradictions between dispositions, positions and ﬁgurations,
but also when the subject has to handle intra-habitus conﬂicts. For instance, Trevor Butt and Darren
Langdridge (2003) studied the diaries of the well-known comedian Kenneth Williams (1928-1988) and found
a deep contradiction between his homosexual dispositions on the one hand, and his deeply conservative,
anti-libertarian mentality on the other; the latter predisposed him to consider anything related to
homosexuality as "ﬁlth". These two fundamental aspects of K. Williams' habitus — both products of
differing and varied socialization processes — were obviously linked to his overdeveloped reﬂexivity which
a reading of his diaries makes very obvious.
Reﬂexivity unrelated to contradictions
2.6 Bourdieu's emphasis on the predominantly pre-reﬂexive nature of the habitus, and his underemphasis
of the interactive dimension of social games has led him to overlook types of reﬂexivity that are not linked
to "crisis" situations — i.e. types of reﬂexivity that are features of everyday situations. The constant
internal accounting actors engage with in routine social interactions (what ethnomethodologists call
"reﬂexive accounting") goes on regardless of whether or not the habitus is congruent with a ﬁeld's
positions. In fact, as Garﬁnkel (1984) has convincingly shown, reﬂexive accounting is a constitutive
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feature of all social games.
2.7 When Bourdieu argues that the habitus is highly ﬂexible and inventive, he does not take seriously into
consideration that this inventiveness, which is required by the game's constantly unfolding interactive
situation, entails reﬂexivity. In other words, players cannot perform at all if they do not combine the take-
for-granted practical logic of their dispositions with the reﬂexive-calculative logic resulting from their
involvement in interactive situations.
2.8 Finally, in addition to reﬂexive accounting, one must also bear in mind that reﬂexivity can be related to
an actor's special disposition, i.e. to a reﬂexive disposition acquired not via crisis situations, but via a
socialization focusing on the importance of "the inner life" or the necessity to "create one's own goals". For
instance, growing up in a religious community which stresses meditation and inner contemplation can
result in members of this community acquiring a type of reﬂexive habitus that is unrelated to contradictions
between dispositions and positions.
2.9 Moreover, reﬂexivity can take historically-speciﬁc forms. Giddens and Beck's reﬂexive modernization,
for instance, refers to a historically-speciﬁc, post-traditional situation where actors ﬁnd themselves obliged
to reﬂexively create their own lifestyles, "their own biography". Given that in late modernity neither tradition
nor collective ideologies can provide a set of goals for organizing everyday existence, individuals are
"forced to choose" — forced, that is to say, to become reﬂexive on matters ranging from the clothes they
wear and the food they eat to the type of family they want to create. In all such cases, major or minor,
broad or narrow goals are constantly constructed and reconstructed by reﬂexive subjects trying to ﬁll the
void left by the demise of traditional codes and early-modern ideologies (Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994).
2.10 Finally, in late modernity reﬂexivity may take less activistic and more "apophatic"[4]forms: the
absence of traditionally or ideologically formulated goals may lead the reﬂexivity-orientated subject to a
type of inner exploration which, instead of consciously setting targets and rationally choosing the means to
achieve them, aims at removing internal obstacles that are preventing the spontaneous emergence of
personal goals. The psychoanalytic tradition is based on such types of reﬂexivity. The aim of analysis is
not to impose on or offer the analysand pre-set goals, but rather to "negatively" eliminate or weaken
various defensive mechanisms that are obstructing the emergence of a person's "genuine" goals. The
same type of apophatic reﬂexivity is found in religious and spiritual traditions where the approach to the
divine is achieved not by rationalistic, cognitive means but by the so-called via negativa. The believer turns
inward in order to eliminate thoughts and/or practices that prevent him/her from becoming an "open vessel"
ready to receive the divine light (Mouzelis, 1999: 87-90).
3. Bourdieu's Conception of the Subject
3.1 In the light of what has been said above, one can argue that Bourdieu's actor is half-way between
Parsons' "oversocialized" and Levi-Strauss' "decentered" subject. For Bourdieu, the subject relates to the
former in the sense that the habitus carrier, in normal non-crisis conditions, portrays a lack of voluntarism
and lack of reﬂexive handling of positions similar to Parsons' "cultural-dope" actor vis-￠-vis the role s/he
plays. It relates to Levi-Strauss' decentered subject in that Bourdieu's actor has only practical rather than
theoretical knowledge of his/her dispositions. This means that at least some of the more unconscious
dispositions come very close to Levi-Strauss' "hidden codes", which refer to the rules below the conscious
surface that people follow without being aware of them.
3.2 All three authors, in different ways of course, underemphasize the agentic, voluntaristic, strategizing
qualities of actors. For Levi-Strauss, anti-voluntarism relates to the structuralist attempt to abolish the
subject-object distinction by decentering the subject, by going beyond or behind surface rules and norms.
For Parsons, the subject-object distinction is maintained, but interaction is underemphazised[5] and players
are portrayed as passive products of objective social structures (Mouzelis 1995: 129ff). In Bourdieu's case
ﬁnally, the subjective-objective divide is not abolished but transcended via a "structurationist" strategy,
which regards the habitus as pertaining to both the objective (the habitus as product of structures) and the
subjective (the habitus as "structuring" structures).[6]
3.3 It may, of course, be argued that it is unfair to criticize Bourdieu's overall theoretical scheme for lack of
voluntarism. It could be objected that, unlike Parsons, Bourdieu constantly refers to actors' struggles, to
their strategies aiming at the acquisition of a ﬁeld's various types of capital (economic, political, symbolic
etc.).[7] But neither the struggles nor the strategies in Bourdieu's theory of practice entail rational
calculation and/or reﬂexive handling of the norms and actions of the players. Strategies for Bourdieu do not
as a rule involve rational calculation and reﬂexive accounting. They are generated and unfold quasi-
automatically as actors, in taken-for-granted fashion, mobilize their dispositional potential within a ﬁeld's
interrelated positions. Therefore, in "normal" conditions the rational, calculating, voluntaristic elements of
action are absent or peripheral. For the French sociologist it is only in exceptional circumstances that,
similar to reﬂexivity, rational strategizing comes to the fore.
3.4 "The most proﬁtable strategies are usually those produced, without any calculation, and in the illusion
of the most absolute 'sincerity', by a habitus objectively ﬁtted to the objective structures. These strategies
without strategic calculation produce an important secondary advantage for those who can scarcely be
called their authors: the social approval occurring to apparent disinterestedness" (Bourdieu 1995: 292,
italics mine).[8] This highly idiosyncratic, non-voluntaristic conceptualization by Bourdieu of the notions of
strategy and struggles creates some serious problems. First of all, his position does not sufﬁciently
acknowledge that the degree of rational calculation and of reﬂexivity involved in social games is an
empirical question. Quite obviously certain games (e.g. a game of chess, inter-ﬁrm competition for the
acquisition of a larger market share, inter-state geopolitical struggles, etc.) require high levels of rational
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3.5 It should by now have become obvious that the reason Bourdieu has conceptualized strategies in a
way that does not entail rational calculation and reﬂexivity has less to do with the rarity of rational
strategizing than with his attempt to "transcend" the objectivist-subjectivist divide. Such transcendence
implies subject-object conﬂation, a lack of distance between subjective dispositions and objective
positions/ﬁgurations; it implies, in other words practices being performed in a taken-for-granted, quasi-
automatic, non-reﬂexive manner. It is only when the objective-subjective distinction is maintained that it is
possible to deal in theoretically congruent manner with cases where situated actors distance themselves
from social structures relatively external[9] to them in order to assess, more or less rationally, the degree of
constraint and enablement these structures offer, the pros and cons, the chances of success or failure of
different strategies, etc.
3.6 Of course Bourdieu cannot completely avoid the above type of voluntaristic consideration in his
empirical work. As already mentioned, when he refers to the "Don Quixote" syndrome, i.e. to situations
where a subject's dispositions clash with a ﬁeld's positions, he does allow for the emergence of reﬂexivity.
But he does so not because but despite his conceptual framework. The latter is constructed around the
idea that there is no distance between the subject as habitus carrier and social structures. Hence
reﬂexivity and rational strategizing (which entail distance) are considered as exceptional states of affairs.
In this way the subject-object distinction is reluctantly brought back into the picture by the back door, so to
speak: it does operate, but only in exceptional cases.
4. Restructuring the SDP Scheme
4.1 To summarize the above: Bourdieu's notion of the habitus and his theory of practice generally—given
that it is based on the idea of transcending the objectivist-subjectivist divide — underemphasizes the
rational, calculative, and reﬂexive aspects of human action. As a result, when he deals with speciﬁc ﬁelds
and the social games related to them, he stresses more their dispositional and positional, and less their
interactive dimensions; more a subject's internalized dispositions and a ﬁeld's positional-institutional
structures, and less its ﬁgurational ones; more the practical logic of dispositions and the normative logic of
positions and roles, and less the rational and reﬂexive logic of interactive situations.
4.2 The habitus concept cannot account effectively for social practices unless its connections are shown
with not only positional and institutional but also with interactive and ﬁgurational structures. The latter,
because they entail notions of reﬂexive accounting, of calculation and of rational strategizing, are
indispensable for an understanding of how practices come into being and how social structures are
reproduced and transformed.
4.3 If the above is given due consideration it will be seen that the only way to overcome the functionalism
and/or determinism which, as many critics have pointed out, characterizes Bourdieu's theory of practice, is
restructuring the structure-disposition-practice (SDP) scheme; so as to ensure that it takes seriously into
account the reﬂexive, rational and voluntaristic aspects of social action and the interactive/ﬁgurational
aspects of social games that they entail. To be more speciﬁc, there are two major modiﬁcations that are
necessary for an effective restructuring of the SDP scheme:
There must be a clear distinction between an initial phase (t1) when social structures are
internalized by the subject via socialization, and a subsequent phase (t2) when the subject as
habitus carrier is involved in a speciﬁc ﬁeld and its games.
Equally, there must be a clear distinction between a ﬁeld's positional/institutional structures (as a
set of positions and roles) and ﬁgurational structures (as a set of patterned relations between actual
players).
4.4 If (a) and (b) are followed, then the S→D→P scheme becomes more complex:
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4.5 At an initial phase (t1) a subject, via varied socializations, internalizes social structures (S) and
acquires a set of dispositions (D). At (t2) the subject or player is situated in a speciﬁc ﬁeld. S/he is
confronted by and has to take into consideration the ﬁeld's interrelated positions, i.e. its institutional
structure (S i) . S/he also has to take into account the ﬁeld's unfolding ﬁgurational structure (S f). Practices
at t2 are the result of an articulation of dispositions (D), positions (S i), and ﬁgurations (S f).
4.6 To put this differently: players involved in a ﬁeld's social game, singly or collectively, produce practices
or game outcomes by mobilizing their dispositions in the light of constraints / enablements generated by a
ﬁeld's institutional and ﬁgurational structures. As far as reﬂexivity is concerned, this does not appear only
when there are incongruencies between dispositions and positions, or even between dispositions, positions
and ﬁgurations. As "reﬂexive accounting", it is a constitutive ﬁgure of all interactive structures. Moreover,
there can be pronounced reﬂexivity not only in situations of incongruency but also when social
circumstances in general and/or a type of socialization in particular favour the development of what has
been called a "reﬂexive habitus" (Sweetman, 2003).
Notes
1 For a succinct formulation of the SDP scheme and its application in the ﬁeld of education see Nash
(2003).
2For a critical discussion of Elias' ﬁgurational sociology and the differences between institutional and
ﬁgurational structures see Mouzelis (1993).
3For a concrete example of these three basic dimensions of a social game see Mouzelis (1995 : 101-14).
4For the distinction between apophatic (negative) and kataphatic (positive) forms of reﬂexivity see
Mouzelis (1999).
5For the underemphasis of the interactive dimension in Parsons' middle and late period see Turner (1990).
6For a comparison of the ways in which Bourdieu's and Giddens' structurationism try to transcend the
objective-subjective divide see Mouzelis (2000).
7For a defense of Bourdieu's theory of practice along such lines see McNay (1999).
8It is fair to note that the absence of conscious calculation in Bourdieu's concept of strategy does not
mean that his theory of practice leads to determinism. "The idea of strategy, like the orientation of practice,
is not conscious or calculated nor is it mechanically determined. It is the intuitive product of 'knowing' the
rules of the game" (R. Hawker 1990: 17). But "knowing the rules of the game" is not sufﬁcient for playing it
successfully. If a game's interactive dimension is seriously taken into account, it will be seen that what
Bourdieu calls "inventiveness" necessarily entails not only an intuitive knowledge of game rules, but also
the reﬂexive, rational handling of such rules. For the strong linkages between interaction and
"inventiveness"/creativity see Joas (1996).
9Relatively "external" in the sense that a ﬁeld's institutional and ﬁgurational structures may exist before a
speciﬁc actor enters a particular ﬁeld and may continue after the actor's temporary or permanent exit.
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